The King of Midwest City
Time and again I try,
Time and again I fail.
Noel Coward
1957 – 1962
In the ninth grade in 1961, I was chosen as one of a group of students to become “Junior Statesmen for a Day.” Each Junior Statesman was paired with a local official and tagged along with the official on his official rounds. A Midwest City councilman drew my name.
The City Council was a part-time advisory board, its members all holding full-time jobs in the private sector. Midwest City, like Oklahoma City, its older stepbrother, had a “weak mayor” system of government, with pretty much all decisions being made by the city manager. The council’s job was to either rubber-stamp the city manager’s policies and decisions, or to fire him and hire a new one.
So instead of tagging along with a “Statesman” going about his daily business, I only got to attend a council meeting for two hours in the evening, sitting at the raised table with my assigned councilman and listening mostly to applications for zoning variances.
The tenth or fifteenth agenda item came up, the applicant pleaded his case and the chairman asked if there were opposition statements, knowing full well why the distinguished gentleman was sitting in the front row with his large rolls of architectural paper.
“The Chair recognizes Mr. Atkinson,” said the Chair. “Are you opposed to the application?”
W.P. “Bill” Atkinson, founder of the town, Sunday school teacher, breeder of Shetland ponies, future gubernatorial candidate and future founder and publisher of The Oklahoma Journal, nodded and strolled to the podium.
“Gentlemen, in 1948 the Finest Architects and City Planners in the World were commissioned to draw up a Master Plan for the City of Midwest City,” he began. After 15 years of treating his city as a chess board, with himself moving the white pieces, Atkinson was unused to asking for permission. He knew that if you moved your pieces just so, and secured your support in advance, you could afford to be humble. Humble was, after all, your public image.
“You Gentlemen know that Midwest City has been honored by Many Organizations for its Design and for its Planning for the Future, which began as long ago as 1942, and which was memorialized by a Master Plan in 1948,” he continued. “Throughout the years, the Master Plan has served as a Guideline for Development – and It Has Always Been Proven To Be Right.
“The Master Plan envisioned not only the Layout of the City Streets, but also determined where Commercial Development should go, for the Betterment and Convenience of the Citizens.”
He really talked like that, in capital letters, when he was on his soapbox.
“The Master Plan has proved itself to be An Exceedingly Good Plan. It has anticipated Traffic Flow, Increased Housing, the Need for More Shopping and the Location of that Shopping. If the City Council has ever been In Doubt, it has always turned to the Master Plan, and the Master Plan has always provided the Right Answer.”
I have to assume that nobody on the dais or in the audience was checking off how many times the phrase “Master Plan” was used that evening. Midwest City was not a hotbed of authority-questioners.
“It has been my Great Pleasure and my Great Honor to champion the Master Plan on Many Occasions, and I do so again tonight because This Proposal” and here he unrolled his drawings, “is in Direct Opposition to the Master Plan.
“This property was planned to be, and has been zoned as, Office Space. This Entire One-Mile Stretch of Road,” he traced the one-mile stretch with his forefinger, “has carefully delineated sections for residential… retail… office…”
My eyes glazed over. Atkinson went on at length, but I stopped listening. Why did he care, I wondered. Why not put office space here and retail space there? After all, they’re only two or three blocks apart.
But retail space, as I later learned, can command much higher rents than office space. Atkinson didn’t own the parcel at issue, the parcel zoned for offices, the parcel whose owner was seeking to have rezoned for retail. What Atkinson owned was the parcel down the street already zoned for retail.
Too much speculative retail construction in too close a proximity to existing retail buildings can cause the bugaboo of supply-and-demand to kick in: too much supply = lower rents; lower rents = lower property values.
I suspect there was also a non-mathematical component to the equation: thwarting the Master Plan = Loss of control.
Not surprisingly, the application for a zoning variance was denied.
**
Born in Texas in 1907, five months before Oklahoma statehood, William P. Atkinson, aka W.P. “Bill” Atkinson (he would legally add “Bill” to his name by court decree and drop the quote marks during his first gubernatorial campaign in 1958) obtained degrees in business administration and journalism from Texas Christian University before moving to up-and-coming Oklahoma City, where he published a newspaper aimed at city churches and taught journalism at a local university. Not doing all that well in the publishing business, he turned his hand to selling real estate, a career in which he had a distinct talent.
Real estate was to be his life’s work and, in the end, his only legacy.
From selling real estate, he branched into developing real estate for the rapidly expanding city. According to his own accounts, he developed a flair for identifying the next direction for city growth, buying up property and building what we now refer to as “spec” houses – houses not built on contract with an owner but with the speculation that they would sell eventually.
Despite the recent Dust Bowl and the lingering Depression throughout the late 1930’s and early ‘40’s, upper-middle-class houses continued to be built and sold in Oklahoma City. The Daily Oklahoman was full of ads for Atkinson’s new houses. He became so successful, in fact, that he was invited to join the inner sanctum of the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber virtually controlled city politics and growth, overshadowing the mayor, city manager and city council.
If the Chamber of Commerce controlled Oklahoma City, E.K. Gaylord controlled the Chamber of Commerce. Second only to Gaylord was Chamber executive Stanley Draper, whose name would later be placed on many a city monument, including a reservoir east of Midwest City. For decades, Gaylord and Draper managed to put their names on nearly every city project of any significance. Atkinson, along with any successful businessman who hoped to have any influence in the city, became one of Gaylord’s “boys.”
And then war broke out in Europe.
Despite Charles Lindbergh and other isolationists, FDR and the military realized that it was only a matter of time until the United States would be dragged into the conflict. Congress and the Pentagon began making plans for three new aircraft supply and repair depots – one in the northeast part of the country, one in the mideast and one in the midwest. Later information indicated that the “midwest” air depot might be located anywhere between Kansas City and Dallas.
With only this sketchy information in hand, Draper went to work, sending lobbyists and Chamber representatives to Washington, D.C., to secure as many defense contracts as possible for Oklahoma City, and to push for the “Midwest Air Depot” to be located in or near the city.
Draper also formed the Industries Foundation, Inc., with subscriptions from local businessmen, to acquire options for the purchase of land to donate to the Department of War as a location for the new aircraft base (and, of course, as an incentive for locating it near Oklahoma City.) The Department had made it clear that it needed – among other requirements – nearly 1,000 acres of flat terrain, a power supply, water, a railroad line and a paved highway to the base from downtown Wherever. It did not intend to pay for any of this.
The Industries Foundation chose two sites it felt would be ideal for the base and quietly acquired options to purchase land at each site. Only two or three people in the city knew the locations of the sites that were being shown to representatives of the War Department, and they weren’t talking. After all, if word got out, land speculators would descend en masse, possibly raising the eventual purchase price.
Although they didn’t miss “the big picture” of landing this industrial plum, Gaylord, Draper and the Chamber missed the little picture. They wanted a major air base on the outskirts of Oklahoma City because of the perks it would bring to the city: chiefly demand for housing and millions of shopping dollars pouring into city businesses each year. It would also be good for the city’s image.
Bill Atkinson thought a bit smaller. What if – just what if – this new military facility ten to twenty miles outside of town were almost self-contained? What if housing and shopping were available immediately adjacent to the base? Just because the Army Air Corps needed 1,000 acres for runways and mile-long buildings (and there would later be a building a mile long), why should military and civilian personnel have to drive all that way from the city to work or to the city to shop?
And why shouldn’t a savvy real estate developer dip his own bread into the federal gravy – as an afterthought to serving the public good, of course.
*
Atkinson was not alone. Other developers began privately buying or optioning large tracts of land on the city’s outskirts, hoping to cash in on the boom. Most of these centered their hopes west or northwest of the city. Atkinson went southeast.
In later years, he would regale listeners with how simple it was. “Gaylord’s newspapers actually published the War Department’s requirements,” he would chuckle. “It had to be within ten miles of downtown, more than four miles from the nearest oil well and very close to a railroad line.”
So Atkinson took a simple compass and a map, drew a circle ten miles in radius from downtown, charted all of the oil wells and railroad lines and deduced the most likely spot. “Anybody could have done it,” he would later say. “I don’t know why they didn’t.”
*
The problem with Atkinson’s story was that neither of E.K. Gaylord’s two daily newspapers published these requirements, not in the specific issue cited often by Atkinson, nor in any other issue. The closest the papers came was in reporting that the War Department was considering two locations near Oklahoma City, each within twenty miles of downtown. No mention of oil wells. No mention of railroads.
The difference between a ten-square-mile radius from Oklahoma City and a twenty-square-mile radius is enormous. A ten-square-mile radius gives an area of 314 square miles, or just over 200,000 acres. Subtract from these the city limits, rivers, creeks and developed areas, adjust for flat terrain, an available 1,000-acre parcel of land, oil wells and railroad lines and your choices become quite limited.
On the other hand, a twenty-square-mile radius gives an area of 1,256 square miles, or well over 800,000 acres. Adjust for the same factors as above and your possible sites are multiplied exponentially.
Atkinson, therefore, did not get his triangulation coordinates from the newspaper. He had to have received his knowledge from inside, probably from insider contacts in Washington, where he had been spending a great deal of time for the past year cultivating Oklahoma congressmen and War Department officials. We’ll never really know for certain. Until his dying day, he maintained that the basic information was published for all to read, and only he had moxie enough to unravel the puzzle.
For some reason, Atkinson’s story never rang true to me but many of those who worked most closely with him still swear they believe it.
**
Southeast 29th Street has always been the dividing line between Tinker Air Force Base (formerly the Midwest Air Depot) and Midwest City. Atkinson determined that the likely location for the depot was in the wheat fields along S.E. 29th, about five miles from downtown Oklahoma City. According to his account, he found the farmers on the south side of 29th to be closed-mouthed and reluctant to discuss selling. He concluded that the Industries Foundation had been there before him.
On the north side, however, landowners were quite willing to sell. Atkinson bought parcels totaling 360 acres – half a square mile – but didn’t record the deeds just yet. This half-section became the original townsite and remained the center of town for nearly 30 years.
The United States had still not entered the war when the announcement was made in February, 1941, that Oklahoma City would be the site of the Midwest Air Depot. When Gaylord, Draper and the Industries Foundation discovered that an anonymous buyer had purchased a half-section of land just across the street from the new depot, they were not pleased, but they held their peace.
Whatever else Atkinson may have been, he was not without a gambler’s instinct, a gambler’s poker face and a gambler’s sang-froid. It was possible – even probable – that the depot would close after the war, leaving hundreds of houses empty across the street to the north. So, instead of a mere housing addition, Atkinson decided to build a town, complete with shopping (Atkinson Plaza, naturally), a city hall, library, schools, parks and churches – and houses too, of course.
He called it Midwest City.
*
Little more than a year later, Draper and the Chamber of Commerce recommended to the War Department that the name of the base be changed to “Tinker Field,” after Maj. Gen. Clarence Tinker, an Osage Indian from Oklahoma who was killed during the Battle of Midway.
Done and done. The former Midwest Air Depot, just across the street from Midwest City, is today known as Tinker Air Force Base.
Payback, even in small doses, is so sweet.
**
Before leaving Washington, D.C., Atkinson secured the services of Stewart Mott, a senior land planning official in the Federal Housing Administration, to plan the new city. Mott designed curved, mostly short streets and cul-de-sacs, with the few straight streets only a block or two long, which explains how I got lost so easily on my first day in Midwest City. Streets in Oklahoma City were laid out on a grid: north-south, east-west, twelve blocks to the mile. You always knew where you were.
Mott’s theory was to make each neighborhood safe for children to play. It was difficult for a car to reach a high speed in Midwest City neighborhoods, and it would be nearly two decades before the city’s first traffic fatality.
Mott’s design for the initial townsite had the town’s main entrance, Mid America Boulevard, running between the east and west wings of Atkinson Plaza for about three blocks and then bumping into three nesting oval-shaped street patterns: a small egg supporting a large egg which, in turn, contained a medium-sized egg. The first and smallest egg, surrounded by East and West Mid-America Boulevard, contained the city offices (fire department, police department, library, city hall and, of course, the municipal water tower). Branching off from the smallest egg was the largest oval shape, formed by East and West Rickenbacker Drive. Inside Rickenbacker but still branching from Mid-America was the middle-sized egg, formed by East and West Lockheed Drive.
And radiating from the three eggs were streets named alphabetically for aircraft manufacturers: East and West Aeronca, East and West Boeing, East and West Curtis, Douglas, Ercoupe, Fairchild and Grumann.
Although the boundaries of the town grew rapidly in the next twenty years, and would continue to grow steadily for another thirty, in the 1950’s and 1960’s the original townsite was still “downtown” to most people – particularly young teenagers. It had most of the major shopping destinations, the original high school (later to become the first of two junior high schools) and it had the Skytrain Theater, scene of many a pubescent tryst and many a teenage prank.
*
Just as Oklahoma City, Guthrie and their surrounding wheat fields sprouted overnight from the hard prairie sod after the Run of ‘89, Midwest City sprouted from the still-young wheat fields after the location of the depot was announced. But rather than being the result of a “Run,” Midwest City started one.
Every real estate agent, developer and entrepreneur for ten counties around descended on Southeast 29th Street, only to find that the Industries Foundation had tied up all the land to the south and Atkinson either owned or had options on everything to the north. Draper and his backers in the Industries Foundation donated their site to the federal government as an investment. Atkinson intended to hang on to his.
The Department of War broke ground on the new air depot in mid-1941 and Atkinson did the same on his new city in mid-1942. But between these two events, the country entered World War II and suddenly it seemed that everything was rationed: not just silk and rubber and gasoline and butter and sugar, but also housing starts. In 1943, the Oklahoma City area was allotted 700 building permits. They all went to Bill Atkinson.
While his map-and-compass story made for great re-telling over the years, Atkinson seems not to have talked for publication about the Miracle of the Building Permits. He did, however, in a gesture of fellowship (or a tactical retreat), offer to share his permits with a group of other developers. After all, there were plenty of profits to go around. And, after all, he owned the land.
Atkinson’s dream was incorporated as a city in 1943, with a population of a mere 600. By the end of the following year, it boasted nearly 1,500 homes, translating into a population of probably between 5,000 and 7,000.
At the end of the war, the Douglas Aircraft Company plant closed. Douglas was another Stanley Draper plum, located at Tinker Field, and had once employed 24,000 workers. But just as Atkinson had predicted, the air base did not close down nor did demand for housing slack off.
In fact, because of returning servicemen and the end of wartime rationing and restrictions, the boom was only beginning. Three new housing developments were added in 1947, four in 1948, two in 1949, six in 1950 and a whopping nine in 1951 – including five projects in the Glenwood area where I spent the first several years of my Midwest City life.
Atkinson formed a variety of companies to service and profit from the rapid building, including (from the top down) development, construction, real estate, lumber, hardware and plumbing. He developed a factory to construct what we now call “modular housing,” in which nearly all units – roof trusses, walls, trimmed-out windows and doors, entire sections of flooring – were pre-assembled at one location and trucked a few blocks to the construction site. By late 1946 he was manufacturing two complete houses per day – and shooting for ten.
Then came the Korean War. Then came the Cold War. Then came the Vietnam War. Traffic at Tinker hardly ever slowed, nor did the demand for adjacent housing and shopping. Tinker’s personnel roster has risen and fallen slightly over the last half-century, but has usually hovered around 20,000 civilian employees and an equal number of military personnel.
In the 1970’s, the base’s Public Information Office claimed that the base employed one out of nine workers in the Greater Oklahoma City area and one out of thirty-five workers in the entire state.
*
Before a single foundation was poured, Atkinson was bragging that his $4 million development, expected to include schools, shops, parks and nearly 700 houses, would be a “model town.” He made his prediction come true the easy way.
Just as he had worked his way up the ranks of the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce, Atkinson joined the National Association of Home Builders and became the organization’s president in 1951. From 1948 to 1950, he was chairman of NAHB’s national contest to name “America’s Model City.”
In what would be W.P.’s third miracle in a decade, Midwest City won the contest. The city still widely promotes this honor in its publications and on its web site, but for at least 40 years no attribution has been given. The official line always goes something like this: “In 1951, Midwest City was honored as ‘America’s Model City.’”
*
No doubt about it, however, W.P. loved his city, nurtured and supported it and loved the role of paterfamilias. He gave to every charity and civic project, joined many of the service clubs, offered Shetland pony rides to children on Sundays at his 160-acre parcel just north of town and allowed teenagers to hold dances in his barn.
As one usually gushing source noted with an atypical degree of candor, “as the city grew and town amenities became necessary, he helped finance community projects. He provided lumber for the new library and land for the country club. Of course every addition to the town became an incentive for people to move there, and every new house meant a bonus to W.P. But no one could call him an absentee landlord.”
And when he wasn’t on his soapbox or in his business mode, he was a sort of “Uncle Bill,” friendly, jocular and eminently approachable.
On a whim one Saturday afternoon, my brother Rick and I rode our bicycles up the long driveway to his house, where we discovered Mr. and Mrs. Atkinson (I have to revert to the formal, here; I was only 12) sitting on the lawn in the shade. They called us over, poured us lemonade and talked to us for a good half-hour, as if we were family. I couldn’t know that in less than ten years, I would become an Atkinson employee.
*
During my second stint at Atkinson’s paper, The Oklahoma Journal, I was the entertainment editor (and sole staff), and was showered with stacks of tickets to movies, the theater, ballet, orchestral and rock concerts. Even in Oklahoma City, I couldn’t find time to review everything and gave away many of the tickets, particularly to an Atkinson grandson who worked in the paper’s composing room. Before long, it became accepted that I would provide the kid with free tickets to any rock concert he wanted. The teenage heir seemed to have his own little racket going on.
Eventually, I said no. “I’ll have my grandfather make you,” he threatened. “That’s fine, Joe. You just go right ahead. Your grandpa pays my salary, and he knows where to find me.”
Two days later, Joe was back. “Mr. Dimick? My grandfather says…uh, I mean, I want to apologize to you. I was out of line. I’m sorry.”
I was in no position to be losing a job at the time, so I wonder how much of my refusal was due to a leftover teenage, in-your-face, don’t-push-me attitude and how much to any real bravery. At the time, however, I patted myself on the back for my moral courage, patted Joe on the back and said that, of course, there would be more tickets in the future – just not on demand.
**
Although Midwest City’s growth and progress – and Atkinson’s career – continued to be covered fairly impartially in the pages of The Daily Oklahoman, Atkinson himself was no longer in the inner circles of Oklahoma City politics. He first alienated Stanley Draper and E.K. Gaylord by going behind their backs and personally profiting from Tinker Air Force Base, did it again during the annexation wars and yet again by thwarting plans to make the Midwest City post office only a branch the Oklahoma City post office.
But Atkinson still longed to play with the big boys. So in 1957, the year I moved to Midwest City, with his town established, thriving and no longer in need of a micro-manager, he decided to run for governor.
Many years later, he called all work to a halt at The Oklahoma Journal for an employee pep rally at the Uptown Cafeteria, just across the street from The Journal and Atkinson’s unofficial headquarters for years. “I want to tell you why The Journal is here,” he began, and gave most of the speech without his usual soap-box-style capital letters.
“I used to be one of E.K. Gaylord’s fair-haired boys,” he said. This was a favorite phrase of his. “I ran his errands, I did his bidding and I supported his politics. I was a Mover and a Shaker in the Chamber of Commerce and Oklahoma City politics.” Capital letters again.
“And then, I committed an unpardonable sin: I figured out where the new air base was going to be. Personally, I think Midwest City has done pretty well. We don’t want to be just another Oklahoma City neighborhood, do we?” He was, of course, preaching to the converted, but he knew his audience.
“But Gaylord never forgave me for that. And when I first ran for governor in 1958, he wouldn’t sell me any advertising in his newspaper.
“I actually went to him and begged. I did everything but get down on my knees. ‘Mr. Gaylord, please! Let’s have an open race. You don’t have to support me, but please let me at least buy advertising.’
“He absolutely refused, and I lost the race. And it happened again four years later. If Mr. Gaylord had allowed me a fair shot at advertising in his papers, I would have been elected. That’s when I decided that central Oklahoma needs – deserves – a newspaper that will Tell Both Sides!
“That’s why we’re here today. That’s why you are here. That’s why The Journal is here. To give the People of Oklahoma a source of all the news – not just what Mr. Gaylord wants to print.”
*
It was a stirring speech and much cheaper than paying a living wage to his staffers. Atkinson told the same story, or variations of it, throughout the years. He told it so often that it became part of Midwest City folklore. One writer, nearly forty years later, noted that Gaylord “refused to accept any advertising from the Atkinson campaign. With the state’s largest paper officially ignoring his candidacy, Atkinson bought lots of TV time, but viewers found him less appealing than the telegenic J. Howard Edmondson, who swept to victory.”
The problem with the story is that it isn’t true. Gaylord became truly vindictive with his advertising policies after Atkinson’s Oklahoma Journal began publishing, but he did not refuse to sell political advertising to Atkinson, nor did his newspapers ignore Atkinson’s candidacy.
(For a while after the founding of Atkinson’s rival newspaper, Gaylord refused to accept advertising from any merchant who also bought ad space in The Journal. When he discovered that some advertisers were having their Sunday inserts printed on Atkinson’s superior offset presses and then delivering them to The Oklahoman, he refused to distribute these “pre-prints” until Atkinson took him to court and won.)
*
Until recently amended, the Oklahoma Constitution prohibited a governor from succeeding himself. Governor Raymond Gary, who would run again four years later, was saddled with charges of “machine politics” and several financial and voter scandals during his term and might not have won the Democratic primary in 1958, even had he been eligible to run. A flock of career politicians and newcomers filed to succeed him.
The Daily Oklahoman quoted unnamed political sources as rating Atkinson “the man to beat” in the coming campaign and noted just ninety days before the primaries that “Atkinson is well out in front in organization and potential support.” Early in the campaign, however, only one thing was certain: whoever won the Democratic primary would be the next governor.
The campaign turned nasty early on and remained that way. Since he was “the man to beat,” all of the candidates began sniping at Atkinson. Several of them, including Edmondson, charged he was part of – and would continue – the policies and allegedly corrupt practices of the “Gary Machine.” Atkinson countered that Edmondson, a 33-year-old district attorney from oil-rich Tulsa, was in the pocket of J. Paul Getty. (A Gaylord editorial noted drily that “It is doubtful if [Getty even knows] there is an election in Oklahoma.”)
To everyone’s surprise, Atkinson came in second to Edmondson and his “prairie fire” campaign in the July primary, although by fewer than 1,000 votes. Since there were eleven Democratic candidates, neither of the top two vote getters gained a majority.
Mud flew fast in the runoff race over the next three weeks – a race which The Daily Oklahoman termed the “dirtiest and crookedest campaign ever waged in Oklahoma.” Edmondson made public the racially restrictive covenants contained in every Midwest City deed, revelations Atkinson never claimed were untrue, but which he decried as hitting “below the belt” and attempting to stir up racial divisions. Atkinson hinted darkly at secrets he had uncovered about Edmondson but was too honorable to use in a political campaign.
Atkinson’s newspaper ads (and, despite his later claims, he ran more political advertisements in The Daily Oklahoman – including full-page ads – than did Edmondson) compared the two candidates in a variety of categories of experience and platforms. The best was “School Experience.”
“W.P. Bill Atkinson: Has been a school teacher and helped build the state’s fourth largest school system in the city he founded.
“His Opponent: Was a student.”
But W.P. made two fatal mistakes which probably cost him the election. Until these missteps, not only was The Daily Oklahoman’s news coverage of his campaign relatively fair and balanced, but even its editorials were fairly benign.
First, an Atkinson staff member forged an Edmondson campaign flyer, completely misstating Edmondson’s stand on a number of hot-button issues. Atkinson was not only slow to distance himself from the charges, but instead of condemning the flyer and promising retribution on the overzealous staffer, he suggested that his opponent’s staff had cooked up the scheme to make him look bad.
The Daily Oklahoman had a field day, printing the forged handbill in its entirety, calling Atkinson’s tactics “a disgrace to the state of Oklahoma” and referring to the fake flyer as the “most dastardly act of the Atkinson campaign.”
The day before Gaylord’s scathing editorial was published, Atkinson made his second serious blunder: he went on the attack against Gaylord, and his diatribe appeared in the same issue of The Daily Oklahoman as Gaylord’s first real editorial attack against him.
Charging that Gaylord was opposed to his campaign because he had fought against Oklahoma City’s annexation plans the year before1, Atkinson told a gathering that “you are going to read in the morning paper that Mr. Gaylord does not like me one bit,” and predicted that if Edmonson won the election, Midwest City would be annexed to Oklahoma City. “This campaign against me is the result of my telling Mr. Gaylord ‘No.’ Had I followed his dictates, I could have had his support. It wasn’t worth the price. I have never been one to knuckle under, not even to E.K. Gaylord.”
It might have seemed a gutsy move to Atkinson at the time, or maybe it was sheer desperation. Either way, it cemented the enmity between Atkinson and Gaylord, which might have been patched up without serious compromise by either side, given different tactics by the candidate.
And it did not resonate with the voters. Atkinson lost the Democratic runoff by a margin of more than two-to-one and Edmondson became governor.
**
Four years later, there were only six Democratic candidates seeking to replace Edmondson, including former Governor Gary. After an initial overwhelming headstart by Atkinson, late polls had the two leading candidates, Atkinson and Gary, running so close that the only certainty Oklahoma Democrats had was the perennially comforting knowledge that the winner of the primary would be the next governor.
Atkinson had spent a year closeted with economists and political advisors and developed a detailed plan for the state’s finances which called for a raise in the state’s sales tax from two percent to three percent. His plan was to convert state financing into a “pay as you go” structure, and to pour large amounts of money into improving schools, colleges, highways and mental health programs.
The Daily Oklahoman’s news pages were as fair to Atkinson as to all the other candidates, and provided him extensive space in which to tout his platforms. And while Gary bought twice as many political ads in the paper, W.P.’s many full-page ads show that he was not barred from advertising this time around, either.
Unfortunately, one of the ads was a reprint of an endorsement editorial from the Tulsa World, without the customary label that it was “A Political Advertisement” or was “Paid for by…” Instead, a large headline labeled it as “EDITORIAL.”
Gaylord held his guns until the day before the primary before announcing, in a genuine editorial, that the Atkinson ad had been placed when all of the paper’s senior officials were at a convention in New York and apologizing for its misleading nature. He accused Atkinson of lying on his campaign expenditure filings of four years before and of exceeding by six times the legal expenditure limit in the current race. Asserting that “Atkinson’s campaigns are always based on deceit,” the editorial concluded (in language that itself could have used a good editor) that “the citizens of Oklahoma need, above everything, an honorable man in the governor’s chair. A deceitful man is not morally honest.”
Gaylord’s positions were usually nothing if not predictable, but he was not one to allow consistency to stand in the way of retribution against his enemies. Where once he had been a formidable critic of Gary and of the scandals during his term of office, he was now practically effusive in his praise for the former governor. Although Gary had made mistakes while in office, he wrote, “he readily admits them,” and “is in a position to give the state a progressive administration and avoid mistakes of the past.”
After Atkinson won the inevitable runoff by only 900 votes, Gaylord initiated full-scale war. Where he had once been the state’s staunchest Democrat, he was now solidly behind the Republican candidate. Where four years before he had editorialized in favor of a penny increase in the sales tax, he now referred to it continually as “a fifty percent increase,” and sliced up selected Atkinson statistics to demonstrate the faulty Atkinson math.
The race between Atkinson and Republican Henry Bellmon was sheer boredom compared with the war between Atkinson and Gaylord. News stories and opinion pieces were heavily laced with tales and speculation about voter revolt, legislative revolt, Democratic defection and the like. Bellmon’s speeches were printed in their entirety. The Sunday front-page editorials became daily occurrences as the election neared.
Atkinson either couldn’t take the stress or couldn’t control his anger. His speeches grew more shrill each day as he lashed out at Bellmon and Gaylord – and The Daily Oklahoman gave him plenty of space to injure himself.
Starting with a telegram to Gaylord in which he stated, reasonably enough, that “your personal animosity toward my candidacy is well known,” he descended into charges that Gaylord was trying “to divide and destroy the Democratic Party,” that Gaylord had left the party “because he couldn’t control it,” and that Bellmon was “dominated” by Gaylord.
“Do you want Gaylord to be governor of this state?” he asked in a campaign speech covered by United Press International, and printed by The Daily Oklahoman. “Do you want Gaylord to write your highway program for you? Do you want Gaylord to do your reapportioning…look after your welfare program…eliminate your county road money…do away with your homestead exemption?”
Atkinson forgot that the press always has the last word. Or maybe he was just now learning. The best last word, just days before the election, was written by The Daily Oklahoman’s political columnist:
Since the newspaper and its publisher will not have their names on the ballot, Atkinson is going to swamp them in the vote getting, but there is considerable debate about how well he is going to fare against Henry Bellmon.
Atkinson has devoted more of his time to running against the paper and publisher, and less to the Republican nominee, than any other candidate for governor.
If Bill Atkinson really wants to catch the people when they are mad at the newspaper, he should drift into a town with the poll takers some morning after the sports department got the score wrong for the local winning high school team.
Henry Bellmon became the first Republican governor of the State of Oklahoma by a margin of 55 to 45 percent.
Despite his campaign’s many tactical blunders, his own seeming inability to either frame an issue clearly or defuse a problem and his general tendency to shoot himself in the foot, Atkinson blamed his proposed sales-tax increase for his defeat. At his election-night party at the Uptown Cafeteria, W.P. flipped a penny to one of his supporters and said, in all seriousness, “This is what beat me.”
1As Oklahoma City went on an annexation spree to try to absorb – or at least to surround – Tinker Air Force Base, the Chamber of Commerce adopted the motto “600,000 in ‘60,” which was printed on all of its publications and all of the city’s telephone books. The City Council, the Chamber and its eminence grise, Stanley Draper, wanted control over all regional development and wanted to prevent housing development that might be in the way of future Tinker expansion. Plus, there was a certain cachet to reaching the magic population figure of 600,000 and of being able to brag temporarily about being the largest city (by area) in the United States and the third largest in the world.
Through a quirk in Oklahoma law, a city could annex adjacent areas without a vote of the landowners. So Oklahoma City began annexing in all directions, but particularly in the areas surrounding Tinker Air Force Base. Midwest City retaliated by beginning an annexation plan of its own, which was fine with Atkinson, since he owned most of the annexed land. Both sides, as well as several other surrounding cities, began annexing in a panic, either offensively or defensively, as in a game of Go. In eight years, Oklahoma City’s area grew eightfold, to more than 640 square miles.
When a bill was proposed in the legislature to allow Oklahoma City to annex existing towns by a majority vote of the big city and the little town – virtually assuring a favorable vote – it was supported by Gaylord and Draper, but opposed by Atkinson, who successfully spoke against it in a joint session of the Oklahoma legislature. Atkinson later claimed that Draper had warned him not to fight the annexation bill or he would never be elected governor.


